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Abstract
Purpose:  The paper examines the effectiveness of internal control systems, explores
the exposure of Spanish banks to the dangers of default as a result of internal control
systems and establishes a relationship between internal controls and credit risk. 
Design/methodology/approach: Quantitative  research  approach  is  used  to  test
hypotheses on the relationship between internal controls and credit risk among listed
banks in Spain. Data from Bankscope and company websites from 2004-2013 were
used. Generalized Least Squares (random effect) econometric estimation technique was
used for the model.
Findings: We find that internal control systems are in place but their effectiveness
cannot be guaranteed. This exposes Spanish listed banks to serious default situations.
There  is  significant  effect  of  internal  controls  on  credit  risk  especially  the  control
environment, risk management, control activities and monitoring. The non-disclosure of
material internal control weakness is a contributory factor to the ineffective internal
control systems. There is however a perceived board ineffectiveness which does not
augur  well  for  effective  internal  control  systems.  Board  characteristics  for  Spanish
banks confirm the agency theory.
Research limitations/implications:  Data unavailability  for  certain years, variables
and many inactive banks did not permit a larger sample size than expected. The use of
quantitative variables lacks flexibility.
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Practical implications: Bank management will find the work useful to ensure strict
enforcement  of  internal  control  mechanisms  and  see  it  as  both  credit  risk  and
operational risk issues. Central bank should hurry to compel banks to disclose material
internal control weakness as provided in the reviewed COSO framework.
Social implications: Ineffective internal controls lead to credit risks, bank closure and
loss of investments. Society suffers a lot from such losses and contagion. Disclosure of
material internal control weakness is a social responsibility of banks.
Originality/value: The authors are yet to come across the use of purely quantitative
variables to model the effect of elements of internal controls on credit risk. This study
opens and adds a new dimension of internal controls not only to be seen as operational
risk issue but also credit risk.
Keywords: Agency problem, Banking, Credit risk, Internal controls
Jel Codes: G21, G32
1. Introduction
In  the wake several  corporate  scandals,  market failures and loss of  investments,  there is
clarion call to ensure market discipline especially on the part of industry players. As much as
possible,  losses  should  be  unanticipated  than  purposely  orchestrated  as  is  seen  in  many
corporate organizations. The possible adoption of soft-laws, self-regulation and high sense of
ethical  behaviour  has  gained  much  prominence  in  the  world  of  business.  Financial
intermediation is  the flow of  funds from surplus to  deficit  units.  The units  also  known as
market participants are made up of individuals, households, institutions or firms, governments
and foreigners (Casu, Giradone & Molyneux, 2006). One important issue bedevilling financial
intermediation  is  information asymmetry.  This  menace  has  the  tendency to  lead to  moral
hazards and adverse selection. Most financial institutions have suffered from moral hazards on
the part of clients expressed through default.
As most important financial intermediaries in developing and industrialized economies, banks
have come under the microscopic eyes of regulators, central banks and direct and indirect
stakeholders since their failure have damming consequences on the economy. Over the past
decades, banks have suffered various forms of crises and the effects have descended down on
firms of all categories causing total halt in such economies which make banks a major source
of contagion especially during periods of crisis. Ensuring bank stability has taken both micro
and macro dimensions. It sounds quite refreshing to hear of macro-prudential regulation of
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banks  but  bank  self-regulation,  internal  discipline,  compliance  and  building  of  stakeholder
confidence through internal controls will be better embraced.
Developments in the financial services industry especially with financial intermediation have
been so rapid in recent times. New product development and innovation, diversification of
financial services products, excessive competition, crave for significant market share through
excessive branching into new geographical areas and desires to benefit from economies scale
and scope have unnecessarily exacerbated the risk exposure of financial institutions and for
that matter banks.
Shareholder  value  maximization-  the  prime objective  of  the  firm requires  that  institutions
minimize  their  risks  as  much  as  possible.  In  contrast  to  this,  managerial  risk  aversion
hypothesis which is traced from the agency argument holds that management will more often
than not pursue actions to minimize their personal risks. Managers therefore engage in actions
that may endanger the maximization of shareholder wealth. Irrespective of whether ensuring
shareholder value maximization or managerial  risk aversion, the issue of risk management
must  be  addressed.  This  attempt  to  align  the  two divergent  stances  of  shareholders  and
management is achieved through effective internal controls. Shareholders and other indirect
stakeholders have confidence in an effective and efficient internal control system. It is also in
the  interest  of  management  to  see  internal  controls  as  a  managerial  tool  rather  than  to
antagonize the introduction of all forms of internal control measures.
Olatunji (2009) studied the impact of internal control system in banking sector in Nigeria but
limited the scope of internal controls to fraud which is found under operational risk. Lakis and
Giriunas (2012) also described internal controls as a measure to deal with fraud. Our present
study builds on already existing works to provide a wider view of internal controls covering all
the  elements  globally  accepted  and  used  like  COSO  and  Basel  Committee  on  Banking
Supervision.  Bedard  (2011)  used  the  US  Sox  internal  controls  which  focus  on  financial
reporting. Ji, Lu and Qu (2015) focused on Chinese Sox internal controls which added among
others organizational structure and human resource management. We use a broader scope of
internal controls (COSO model) which covers five broad areas namely control environment, risk
assessment, control activities, monitoring and information and communication systems. 
In cases where other authors have used the COSO framework of internal controls, the main
type of data has been primary sources collected through the use of questionnaires. We use
purely secondary data to enable a more statistical analysis and a quantitative approach to
model  internal  controls  which  the  authors  are  yet  to  come  across.  Moreover,  most  risk
management literature identified internal controls as operational risk issue but we extend the
discourse to see if internal controls have any relation with credit risk. This approach provides
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another dimension of the relationships between internal controls and credit risk to add up to
the already existing good works of the authors cited.
Jin, Kanagaretnam, Lobo and Mathieu (2013) found that if banks comply with internal controls,
they  reduce  their  risk  taking  behaviour  and  are  less  likely  to  experience  failure.  The
ramifications of credit risk for banks extend beyond the investors, to the industry, the nation
and the international community. Credit risk issues have monetary implications and seriously
jeopardize  bank  market  discipline  (Delis  &  Karavias,  2015).  The  aftermath  of  the  global
financial  crisis  has  been  very  devastating  for  many  nations  including  Spain.  The  banking
industry has been hardest hit by Spain’s economic downturn and the situation was described
by Carballo-Cruz (2011) as the worst crisis the country has faced in the last fifty years. The
volume of non-performing loans has been on the increase and many banks have collapsed
bringing the number of savings banks from 45 in 2009 to 7 in 2014 (Chislett, 2014). Chislett
reported that non-performing loans ratio moved from 0.6% in 2007 to more than 25% in
2014. The situation is a recipe for investigation hence the choice of the study area.
The purpose of  this  study is  to  examine  the effectiveness of  internal  control  mechanisms
among Spanish banks, investigate exposure of Spanish listed banks to default risk as a result
of poor internal control mechanisms and determine how internal controls affect credit risk.
The study will go a long way to make new revelations and confirm previous research on how
internal controls affect not only operational risk as presented in most finance literature but also
credit risk. The structure and effectiveness of internal controls is evident in the reporting of
banks and this is explored to unveil its relationship with a core function of banks which is
making  loans.  Thus  the  study  reinforces  prudence  and  cautiousness  on  the  part  of
management even though the profit maximizing objective cannot be shirked in the process of
discharging a critical function. This study opens a grey area in the use of quantitative variables
to study an area which hitherto has been studied with the use of primary data. The rest of the
paper  covers  literature  review,  hypotheses  and  variables,  design/methodology/approach,
findings and conclusion.
2. Literature Review
The supply of funds from surplus to deficit units and viceversa should be an ongoing activity to
ensure effective resource allocation. The financial system does this job better and financial
institutions  of  which  banks  constitute  the  largest  have  a  crucial  role  in  this  financial
intermediation process. Banks are asset and risk transformers, liquidity providers and tools for
implementing government financial and economic policies (Casu et al., 2006; Mishkin, 2006).
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The  Spanish  banking  industry  comprise  mainly  three  types  of  banks;  commercial  banks,
savings banks and credit unions (Alamá, Conesa, Forte & Tortosa-Ausina, 2015). Unfortunately,
the industry has witnessed very unpleasant moments in recent times for which Carballo-Cruz
(2011)  had  no  better  way  of  describing  than  to  say  the  worst  crisis  the  country  has
experienced in the last five decades. Tracing the evolution of the crisis, the writer thinks it is an
extension of the international financial crisis but emphasizes that internal imbalances in the
pre-crisis period prepared fertile grounds for the crisis to escalate. 
In  an  earlier  study,  Lozano-Vivas  (1998)  described  the  Spanish  banking  industry  as  so
competitive that commercial banks had to adjust their deposits and loan rates. Unjustifiable
adjustment of cost of funds have serious implications for the kind of credit market products
and  the  processes  of  initiating,  negotiating,  funding,  servicing  and  monitoring  loans.  The
immediate effect of the crisis became evident at the demise of 38 savings banks within five
years when their number reduced from 45 in 2009 to 7 in 2014. Chislett (2014) reported the
abnormal rise in non-performing loans from 0.6% in 2007 to more than 25% in 2014 thus
warranting a European Stability Mechanism for a bailout where about €100 billion was injected
into the industry as a form of capitalization. The regionally based unlisted banks known as
Cajas accounted for around half of the loans in the domestic banking system and are touted as
orchestrators of the crisis. These Cajas exploited an existing weak and relaxed market coupled
with political interference, incompetent board of directors, reckless banking practice through
over branching and over-ambitious investments (Chislett, 2014). 
Ironically, as these Cajas were collapsing, they dissipated into commercial banks in the form of
mergers and acquisitions thus infesting the commercial banks with their canker. In some cases,
seven  Cajas  had  to  merge  to  form a  bank.  However,  analysis  from recent  figures  shows
improvement in the books of the banking sector thus providing some light at the end of the
tunnel. Profits for largest six banks have increased more than four times higher than 2012 and
sharp drops in provision for loan losses. Non-performing loans are still higher but the increase
is at a decreasing rate in relative terms. There have been efforts to enforce market discipline
through the tripartite effort of Banco de España (BdE), Fondo de Garantia de Depositos (FGD)
and  Fondo  de  Reestructuracion Ordenada  Bancaria  (FROB).  The  Ministerio  de  Economia  y
Competitividad is also providing cooperation and support to come out with a framework for
regulation (IMF, 2012). The IMF country report affirms the need to come out with stricter laws
on internal governance that conforms to international standards. The picture about the Spanish
banking  industry  makes  it  appropriate  for  study  especially  on  the  issue  of  bank  internal
governance (controls) and the resultant huge non-performing loans (credit risk). The situation
is purely a managerial failure which is not uncommon in banking literature especially where the
internal control system is weak for possible exploitation. 
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From a behavioural compliance theory approach, managers should do all they can to profile the
company in  a manner  that  consolidates  a  positive  reputation  which  are  inclined to  sound
corporate  governance pedestals.  Given new names such as soft  laws and soft  regulations
(Morth,  2004;  Sahlin-Anderson,  2004)  managers  should  learn  by  intuition,  to  oblige  to
principles and best practices. The behavioral compliance theory draws motivation from efforts
to  rally  support  from  stakeholders  by  raising  the  reputation  of  the  company  through
compliance to corporate governance principles. Attempts to avert any negative  profiling of
companies or engaging in acts to ruin the reputation of the company on the part of managers
are enforced through sound and established internal controls. 
From the  agency theory,  managers  may engage  in  actions  that  perpetuate  their  personal
aggrandizement. Hart (1995) contends that there is a trade-off between incentives and risk
sharing. The cost associated with possible conflict of interest between agents and principals are
known  as  agency  costs.  These  according  to  Hart  are  traceable  to  auditing,  budgeting,
compensation  and  other  forms  of  internal  controls  instituted  to  check  management  and
employee misbehaviour. According to Letza, Kirkbride, Sun  and Small (2008), the argument
underlying the agency theory is that, managers will only act to maximize shareholder value if
only it is not in conflict with his or her own personal self-interest. Managers or employees may
carelessly initiate, originate and fund potentially unsuccessful loans if internal controls are not
religiously  adhered  to.  The  many  cases  of  credit  risk  expressed  in  non-performing  loans,
delinquencies  and  all  forms  of  loan  restructuring  which  makes  the  loan  books  dirty  are
traceable  to  poor  adherence  and  non-compliance  to  established loan granting procedures.
Some loan defaults are employee-caused, others are bank-caused and others are client-led.
Internal  controls  seek  to  address  the  employee  and  bank-led  causes  of  default.  The
deliberations above support the fact misbehaviour on the part of management (which in this
case  carelessly  contracted  loans  is  being  cited)  could  be  controlled  with  proper  internal
controls.
Most corporate governance literature underscores the indispensable role of internal controls in
strengthening  the  governance  structure  of  organizations  (Maijoor,  2000).  The  long-term
confidence  of  stakeholders-government,  suppliers,  investors,  customers  in  the  areas  of
reporting,  accountability  and  reliable  information  is  fortified  with  effective  internal  control
systems (Rittenberg & Schwieger, 2001). The Committee on Sponsoring Organizations (COSO)
(1992) defines internal  controls  as the process affected by the entity’s board of directors,
management  and  other  personnel  designed  to  provide  reasonable  assurance  regarding
achievement  of  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  operations,  reliable  financial  reporting  and
compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Following numerous corporate scandals, the
US Congress passed a law which gave birth to the Sarbenes-Oxley Act 2002 which was seen as
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an improvement upon the COSO framework thus giving emphasis to monitoring and reporting.
It is therefore not surprising to find most internal control research directed towards financial
reporting. The SOX Act requires that management reports material internal control weakness
to  the  board  and  external  auditors.  The  adequacy  of  internal  control  systems  and  the
attestation by independent auditors on the report by management is provided in the Act.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) defined internal controls as ensuring that
senior  management  establishes  and  maintains  an  adequate  and  effective  internal  control
system and processes. The system and processes should be designed to provide assurance in
areas  including  reporting  (financial  and  operational),  monitoring  compliance  with  laws,
regulations and internal policies, efficiency and effectiveness of operations and safeguarding of
assets. After  an extensive theoretical  study of internal controls,  Lakis and Giriunas (2012)
defined  internal  controls  as  that  part  of  enterprise  management  system  ensuring  the
implementation  of  goals,  effective  economic-commercial  performance  of  the  enterprise,
observation  of  accounting  principles  and  effective  control  of  work  risks  that  enables  the
organization minimize the number of intentional and unintentional mistakes, to avoid frauds in
the  process  of  enterprise  performance  made  by  authority  or  employees.  Their  definition
emphasizes effective risk management just as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
definition.
In responding to changes in the business environment, the COSO framework has been revised
in the year 2013 which pays attention to some of the SOX Act provisions. The new framework
which was represented in a cubic shape covers the five elements (control environment, risk
assessment, control activities, information and communication and monitoring), the objectives
(operations, reporting and compliance) and level (entity, division, operating unit and function)
(McNally, 2013). The revised framework identifies seventeen principles under the five broad
elements.  The  control  environment  covers  demonstration  of  commitment  to  integrity  and
ethical  values,  exercising  oversight  responsibilities,  establishing  structures,  authority  and
responsibility, demonstrating commitment to competence and enforcing accountability. Under
risk management, companies should specify suitable objectives, identify and analyse risks,
assess fraud risk and identify and analyse significant change. The control activities comprise
selecting  and  developing  control  activities  in  general  and  over  technology  and  deploying
policies and procedures. The next internal control element is information and communication
and this covers the use of relevant information and communicating internally and externally.
The final  element is  on monitoring and this  is  about conducting on-going and/or separate
evaluations  and  evaluating  and  communicating  deficiencies  (McNally,  2013).  This  new
framework is a combination of the SOX provision of communicating material internal control
weakness.
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From the deliberations, we try to define internal controls as a managerial tool which covers all
set of daily activities in all areas of the organization, at all levels towards safeguarding the
assets, ensuring compliance and transparency, communicating material weakness, protecting
stakeholder interest in order to achieve the long-term goals of  the organizational.  We see
internal controls as such a comprehensive activity that it covers the entirety of all that goes on
in  an organization.  Even though external  controls  could  be seen as a separate  discipline,
effective internal control systems should ensure that everything including external controls are
religiously adhered to. 
The benefits of observing internal controls are unchallenged. Although Bhagat and Jeffers Jr.
(2002) outline external governance and other factors as capable of aligning the interests of
managers and owners, internal governance does this better and goes a long way to deepen
ethical behaviour on the part of managers. Legislation provide a one-size-fits-all approach to
curb misbehaviour, internal controls have proven very successful in the world of business as
capable  of  minimizing  the  pursuit  of  opportunistic  tendencies  by  management.  Internal
controls minimize the agency costs and therefore increase profits and sales of companies who
invest  in  it  (Alves  & Mendes,  2004;  Fernández-Rodríguez,  Gómez-Ansón & Cuervo-García,
2004; Goncharov, Werner & Zimmermann, 2006). Internal controls enhance the reputation of
listed companies which has the tendency to affect share price positively (Fombrun & Shanley,
1990). This was confirmed by Hart (1995) who contended that reducing agency costs increase
firm value.
The essence of internal controls is to reduce information asymmetry, promote best practices in
transparency and protect shareholders against the power of rulers (Salhi & Boujelbene, 2012).
A critical look at most bank financial statements reveal very alarming figures anticipated as
loan losses.  This  has  been identified  by American Institute  of  Certified  Public  Accountants
(AICPA) (2006) as the top on the list  of  bank deficiencies.  The observation of sound and
effective internal controls is a major driver to investor confidence and earns the institution
significant amount of  reputational capital.  The carelessness with which credit  are initiated,
funded, serviced and monitored has the tendency to trigger default, crisis and bank failure. Jin
et al. (2013) found that banks without proper internal controls could grow temporarily but they
have higher likelihood of failing in the near future. This defeats the going concern concept of
organizations of which banks are no exception. In tracing the path to bank failure, the first
stop  point  is  credit  risk  which  experienced  through  borrower  default  before  liquidity  and
insolvency sets in. There is no bad borrower but always a bad lender. The trajectory of bank
failure follows that credit risk leads to liquidity risk then to insolvency, bankruptcy and then
failure.  When  banks  fail,  there  is  a  greater  disincentive  to  depositors,  investors  and  the
externalities on other banks.
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The effectiveness of internal controls have been studied along the dimensions of the efficiency
and  effectiveness  of  activities,  reliability  of  information  and  compliance  with  laws  and
regulations (Jokipii, 2006). Internal control systems were developed by the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision to ensure prudence and stability in the financial system. Anecdotal
evidence from numerous bank failures and even the quite recent financial crisis gives support
to the fact that credit  is  a major contributory factor to these failures. Banks benefit  from
transforming their liabilities into assets thus an incentive for optimal risk benefit behaviour is
pursued but bank managers owe their principals a duty of care (fiduciary relationship). Moral
hazards and adverse selection emanates from the exploitation of informational economies by
counter parties and can be best  be minimized if  management is  extra careful  in its asset
creation function. There is much empirical support to the fact that loans constitute the greatest
proportion  of  bank  assets  (Casu  et  al.,  2006;  Mishkin,  2006).  Ellul  and  Yerramilli  (2013)
reported that financial institutions with strong internal risk controls are able to survive financial
crises and refute the claim that the financial crisis did not affect all institutions the same way
as speculated by some experts in finance. It is not uncommon to find bank managers over-
ambitiously creating very risk assets (credit facilities) in the name of higher return expectation.
Although there are a myriad of factors that contribute to credit risk, the most avoidable ones
could be dealt with if there are sound and religiously-adhered-to internal controls within the
institutions.
The rate of credit defaults has been so alarming in all areas of the financial services industry.
General Accounting Office (GAO) (1994) expressed worries about a seemingly unjustifiable
provision  for  loan  losses  which  lack  evidence.  Although the  work  of  Altamuro  and  Beatty
(2010) addressed this conservative attitude, they did not study the exact relationship between
internal controls and credit risk. It was reported in separate studies that weak internal controls
affect loan loss provision (GAO, 1991; GAO, 1994).
The study has been presented in the conceptual framework that combines all the necessary
elements of internal controls widely used by researchers in this field.
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Figure 1. Effect of internal controls on credit risk (Author’s construct)
The  framework  for  the  study  comprehensively  encompasses  all  the  elements  of  internal
controls which are control  environment, risk assessment,  control  activities,  monitoring and
information  and  communication  systems.  The  key  objectives  of  internal  controls  are
effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting and compliance with
applicable  laws.  These  cardinal  objectives  of  internal  controls  and  attributes  which  are
preventive, detective and curative have all been covered in the study. 
3. Variables and hypotheses 
3.1. Credit Risk
It  is  gradually  becoming alarming the amount of  provision for  loan losses.  This  has been
identified by AICPA (2006) as the number one deficiency of banks. Al-Tamimi and Al-Mazrooei
(2007) studied UAE banks and reported that among three most important risks facing the
banks was credit risk. Credit risk is the likelihood of a borrower or counter party defaulting in
the conditions of a loan agreement, contract or indenture either in part or in full (Sobehart,
Keenan & Stein, 2001). Banks stand to enjoy benefits of enjoying reputation capital, attracting
more investments and being more profitable if they take risk management very serious. There
is evidence that banks which have paid particular attention to risk management have benefited
from  credit  availability  which  led  to  the  creation  of  better  bank  assets  and  profitability
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(Cebenoyan & Strahan, 2004). Banks in Japan have had souring figures in the amount of non-
performing loans and provision for loan losses which are normally used as proxies for credit
risk (Fukuda, Kasuya & Akashi, 2009). The writers reported of the warning from the Japanese
government  on the  need for  banks  to  reduce  non-performing loans  since  it  has  seriously
affected the financial health of the banking industry. Jiménez, Lopez and Saurina (2013) cited
Salas and Saurina (2002) who studied Spanish commercial and savings banks and found that
credit  risk measured by non-performing loans is  by bank size  and rapid credit  expansion.
Further evidence is provided about Spanish banking industry that lenient credit terms among
other factors determines non-performing loans (Saurina & Jimenez, 2006). The cases of rapid
credit expansion and lenient credit terms are traceable to weak internal control structures.
Credit risk affect the bank reputation and translate to other risks especially in situations where
internal governance mechanisms are very weak (Haq, Faff, Seth & Mohanty, 2014). This makes
credit risk an important issue for banks to deal with and we therefore use it as the dependent
(outcome) variable  around which internal  controls  and other bank specific  factors  revolve.
From the discussions above, we conjecture a relationship between internal controls and credit
risk and therefore hypothesize that:
There is significant relation between internal controls and credit risk.
3.2. Board Size
The  size  of  the  board  of  directors  have  influences  over  deliberations  and  control  over
management (Aliyu, Jamil & Mohamed, 2014). There are different schools of thought as to
whether large or small board sizes positively affect performance of firms. Small board size
reduce the agency cost associated with large board size (Eldenburg, Hermalin, Weisbach &
Wosinska, 2004). Uwuigbe and Fakile (2012) chastised large board size for ineffectiveness and
possible lack of coordination as compared to smaller board size. On the other hand (Chen & Al-
Najjar,  2012) confirmed that  large board size contributes positively  to the performance of
firms. Although this study is not about board size and performance, the bottom-line is the
board’s  ability  to  contribute  to  deliberations,  provide  reliable  information  and  avoid
manipulations in board decisions. We therefore hypothesize that: 
Board size significantly affects credit risk.
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3.3. Board Expertise in Finance
The numerous corporate scandals that occurred at the blind side of the board of directors of
affected companies have brought caution to board composition. Some authors refer to it as
board experience.  Most  board members  especially  for  banks  require  that  at  least  a  good
number of them should have some form of expertise in Banking and Finance. This requirement
is  given emphasis  in  the Sarbanes-Oxley Act  of  2002. Burak Güner,  Malmendier  and Tate
(2008)  reported  that  board  members  with  finance  background  significantly  affect  capital
budgeting and capital  structure decisions and policies of  non-banks. We abstract from this
finding and expect that with their expertise, board members with finance background should
be capable of taking good risk assessment decisions which is a major pillar of internal control
systems. Interesting and varying results on board expertise in finance were discovered in the
pre and peri crisis period on the stock performance of banks (Minton, Taillard & Williamson,
2010). We hypothesize from the above that:
Board expertise in finance significantly affects credit risk. 
3.4. Management Experience
Apart from the board being experienced in finance, management should also be on top of their
jobs.  The  agency  problem  rests  so  much  on  managerial  decisions.  The  experience  of
management will go a long way to determine the kind portfolios they construct as well as other
critical  investment decisions (Burak Güner et al.,  2008).  The risk management element of
internal controls requires that management become very experienced to ensure effective risk
management and internal control.  Ikpefan and Ojeka (2013) cited Central  Bank of Nigeria
(2006) that management and board expertise were vital corporate governance requirement to
ensure effective internal governance. We therefore hypothesize that:
Management experience has significant relationship with credit risk.
3.5. Revenue Diversification
Bank  managers  in  their  quest  to  be  more  profitable  diversify  their  investments  to  have
revenues from non-loan sources. The nature of financial intermediation has changed and banks
have diversified their revenues tremendously (Haq et al., 2014). The incentive for banks to
diversify,  stems from related factors like bank size, management and board expertise and
competition within the industry. Within the internal control framework, the extent and nature
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of diversification is captured as an important element which could be bring about management
misbehaviour  (McNally, 2013). There are mixed reports about the effect of diversification on
non-performing loans and in some cases no relation is reported at all (Hu, Li & Chiu, 2006).
We anticipate a significantly positive relationship between diversification and credit risk since
the incentive to be more profitable increases the risk exposure of banks as they expand and
diversify. We hypothesize that:
Revenue diversification has significant positive effect on bank credit risk.
3.6. Board Independence
One of the internal control elements is monitoring which is mostly performed by the board of
directors. This means that if the board is very independent, there is the tendency for a better
monitoring function. The ability for an independent board to be more efficient in monitoring
management is given support from literature (Eling & Marek, 2009; Pathan, 2009). Eling and
Marek  found  that  monitoring  had  significant  effect  on  risk  taking  behaviour  of  insurance
companies  in  the  UK  and  Germany.  An  earlier  report  by  Agrawal  and  Mandelker  (1990)
revealed that monitoring should be actively done and that board members can be large in
numbers and independent but not active. We therefore hypothesize that:
Board independence significantly affects bank credit risk.
3.7. Compliance, Prudence and Safety
Banks are the most heavily regulated institution because of the risky nature of their business
(Mishkin, 2006). Not all deposits are allowed to be given out as loans hence some reserve
requirements should be kept against liquidity problems. Such practices ensure prudent bank
management and safe keeping of bank assets (Casu et al., 2006). Internal control systems
ensure compliance with such regulatory requirements. We hypothesize that:
Compliance, prudence and safety significantly affect credit risk.
3.8. Audit Quality
The whole discipline of internal control falls within the domain of auditing. The audit committee
performs  a  monitoring  function  to  ensure  sound  and  acceptable  financial  reporting  and
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corporate accountability. Audit committees perform internal governance function to protect the
company from impairment suffered from reputational risks (Zhang, Zhou & Zhou, 2007). It is
expected banks with good audit quality will  enhance effective internal control systems and
therefore reduce credit risk. We hypothesize that:
Audit quality has significant relationship with credit risk.
3.9. Quality and reliability of financial information
Stakeholders would want to express confidence in the timeliness and reliability of financial
information management present. Especially with regulators, compromises with this condition
attract fines and sanctions. Reliable financial information is an audit function banks would want
to engage first class auditors to earn the organization some reputational capital (Zhang et al.,
2007).
The quality and reliability of financial information significantly affect credit risk.
Apart from the independent variables, there are some variables which can influence credit risk
but are not directly captured as internal control variables. These variables are controlled in the
study and can be seen below.
3.10. Bank Size
There is enough literature support for bank size to affect decisions of internal controls and
bank operations (Laeven & Levine, 2009). There is the tendency for large banks to be more
very mindful of internal controls than small size banks. Size can determine the variety of credit
products available to a financial institution (Eling & Marek, 2009). Small firms are likely to have
lesser incentive to improve internal controls (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins & Kinney, 2007; Doyle,
Ge  &  McVay,  2007)  whilst  larger  banks  might  be  well-resourced  to  invest  in  internal
controls.Bank size  was found to have negative  relation with credit  risk measured by non-
performing loans (Hu et al., 2006). We therefore control for bank size and hypothesize that:
Bank size significantly affects credit risk.
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3.11. Bank Age
Age of business affect the kind of investment and financing decisions. So much experience is
acquired and companies which have been in business for long have good links and access to a
lot of opportunities than new and upcoming ones. It is reported firms that have existed for
long have less material internal control weakness (Tang, Tian & Yan, 2015). We hypothesize
that:
Bank age significantly affect credit risk.
3.12. Profitability intent (Net Interest Margin)
Altman (1968) and Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundstedt (2004) found that a company could
probably fail if it is unprofitable and highly leveraged. In a bid to avoid failure, banks pursue
efforts to be very profitable (Shumway, 2001). There are various measures of profitability but
the nature of the study focuses so much on loan activities so the most appropriate measure of
profitability is net interest margin. We argue that the tendency to maximize profits which is
very  common  with  management  could  affect  the  kind  of  assets  created.  We  therefore
hypothesize from these abstractions that:
Net Interest Margin significantly affects credit risk
3.13. Corporate restructuring
When companies are restructured through a merger or acquisition or by any kind, the rules of
engagement may change including internal controls. Chen, Dong, Han and Zhou (2013) found
evidence  of  relation  between  corporate  restructuring  and  internal  control  practices.  It  is
therefore likely that after a restructure, internal control systems might improve or deteriorate
which can affect the loan decisions and credit risk. We therefore conjecture that:
Corporate restructuring significantly affects credit risk.
3.14. Leverage 
The composition of debt in a bank’s capital structure exposes it to some consequences and
especially  when default  rate  is  high,  servicing these debts  becomes a problem.  Corporate
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failure could emanate from high leverage (Altman, 1968; Hillegeist et al., 2004). We therefore
hypothesize that:
Leverage significantly affects bank credit risk.
3.15. Design/Methodology/Approach
The  study  design  is  purely  a  quantitative  approach  to  establish  the  relationship  between
internal controls and credit risk. The statement and statistical test of hypotheses makes our
study a deductive approach. Secondary data was obtained from Bankscope for eight banks
listed on the Spanish Stock Exchange which had data available on over fifteen variables from
the period 2004-2013. The sample description can be found in Table 1.
Variable Number of observationsRequired Actual Missing
Bank 80 80   
Year 80 80
NPL/TotLoans 80 75 5
Loan/Deposit 80 78 2
Loans/TotAssets 80 78 2
NonEarningAsset/TotAssets 80 78 2
TotalAssets 80 78 2
Boardindependence 80 73 7
BoardExpertiseinfinance 80 73 7
ManagementExperience 80 73 7
BoardSize 80 73 7
AuditQuality 80 75 5
AgeofBusiness 80 75 5
NetInterestMargin 80 75 5
Newbranches 80 75 5
CorporateRestruc 80 75 5
DebtTotalAssets 80 75 5
Table 1. Description of sample and variables
The  table  above  shows  the  variables,  the  expected  number  of  observations,  actual
observations available for analysis and the missing values.
We  also  obtained  corporate  information  about  board  members  and  management  from
corporate governance annual reports and company websites. The banks involved in this study
had been operative for at least seven years within the ten-year study period. Our sample
period covers some pre-crisis period to post-crisis period to ensure some balance even though
we did not use any baseline period. We used listed banks because these are the banks that
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report major internal control information for public use. There are basic requirements about
corporate governance and board characteristics of listed companies which is very crucial in this
study.  The  unavailability  of  data  for  certain  years  on  certain  variables  makes  the  data
unbalanced,  however  basic  assumptions  regarding  the  use  of  panel  data  were  met  thus
justifying the study.
4. Empirical models
We propose a general equation for the study that credit risk is a function of internal controls.
This  equation  is  further  decomposed  to  arrive  at  the  overall  model  that  contains  all  the
independent and control variables using their proxies. From Equation (1)
CRit = f(INTCONT) (1)
Where 
CRit = Credit risk for bank i for the time period t
INTCONT = internal controls
The Equation (1) above covers the topic that credit risk is a function of internal controls which
means  that  there  is  a  linear  relationship  between  internal  controls  and  credit  risk.  We
decompose Equation (1) to obtain the variables representing internal controls to obtain (2)
INTCONT= f(bodindp,bodexpfin, bodsize, mgtexp, lns/dep, lns/totass,
nea/totass, audqua, nwbrnch)
(2)
Internal controls as explained by the COSO report cover five broad elements which are control
environment,  risk  assessment,  control  activities,  monitoring  and  information  and
communication systems (Chen et al., 2013). These elements have been represented by the
variables like board independence (bodindp), board expertise in finance (bodexpfin), board
size (bodsize), management experience (mgtexp), loans to deposit ratio (lns/dep), loans to
total  assets  (lns/totass),  non-earning  assets  to  total  assets  (nea/totass),  audit  quality
(audqua), new branching (nwbrnch). These variables which cover all the five broad domains
of internal controls found in the conceptual framework constitute the independent variables for
the study. 
We indicate that there are bank-specific and other variables which could affect the dependent
variable  in  one  way  or  the  other  and  must  be  controlled.  These  variables  are  bank  size
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(Bnksz),  bank age (bnkage),  profitability intent (NIM),  corporate restructuring (corpres)
and  leverage  (lev).  When  all  the  independent  and  control  variables  are  included  in  the
regression model, we obtain Equation 3.
LLP/TLit = β0it + β1itbodindp + β2itbodexpfin + β3itbodsize + β4itmgtexp + 
β5itlns/dep + β6itlns/totass + β7itnea/totass + β8itaudqua + β9itnwbrch + 
β10itbnksz + β11itbnkage + β12itnim + β13itcorpres + β14itlev + εit
(3)
where the subscripts i denotes Spanish Listed Banks (i= 1,2,3,4……. 71),  t represent time
period (t= 2004, 2005, 2006…. 2013),  β1, β2, β3……… β14 are the parameters to be
estimated and ε represent the idiosyncratic error term.
The independent variables which are the elements of internal control and the control variables
have been included in Equation (3) for the general model.
Although the data is not perfectly balanced panel due to data unavailability for some banks in
some years for some variables, the data passed reliability tests thus making the results very
reliable. We use Generalized Least Squares regression to estimate the econometric model. Two
main estimation techniques are used for GLS which are random effect and fixed effect models.
Usually, for panel data (times series cross-sectional data) fixed effect models controls for all
time-invariant  differences  between  the  individuals  so  the  estimated  coefficients  cannot  be
biased  hence  fixed  effect  model  estimation  is  not  ideal  for  time-invariant  causes  of  the
dependent variables (Torres-Reyna, 2007). For random effect estimations, the assumption is
that the entity’s error term is not correlated with the predictors thus allowing for time-invariant
variables in the explanatory variables. 
Torres-Reyna reported that random effect allows for generalization of inferences beyond the
sample used. Hausman’s test was performed to ensure reliability of data sets and also help
select the most appropriate between fixed and random effects. Hausman’s test tests whether
the unique errors are correlated with the regressors. The Hausman’s test suggested the use of
random effect results for the regression. The random effect technique is robust to first order
autoregressive disturbances (if any) within unbalanced panels and cross-sectional correlation
and  or  heteroskedasticity  across  panels  (Pathan,  2009).  A  summary  of  the  dependent,
independent and control variables with their exact measures and expected signs have been
provided in Table 2. 
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Internal control
element Variables Proxy variables
Dependent Variable  Credit risk Non-Performing Loans to Total Loans
Independent
variables 
Control environment Board size Number of board members 
Risk assessment 
Board expertise in 
finance
 
 
 
Risk exposure
 
 
Management 
experience
Number of board members with 
banking or finance background as 
ratio of total board members
 
Ratio of Non-earning assets to total
assets
 
Number of management members 
with at least five years’ experience 
Control activities 
Diversification 
 
 
Ensuring credit 
limits
 
Compliance and 
Prudence 
 
Number of yearly new branches
 
Loans to total assets ratio
 
Loans to deposit ratio
Monitoring
Board independence
 
 
 
Audit quality
Number of independent board 
members as a ratio of total board 
members 
 
Use of top six auditing firms
 
Information and 
communication 
systems
Reliability of 
financial reports
Timeliness of financial information 
and adherence to international 
standards
Control Variables
 Bank size Logarithm of total assets 
 Bank age Number of years in business 
 Profitability intent Net Interest Margin 
 Corporate restructuring
Dummy variable of 1 if bank has 
restructured and 0 if not
 
 Leverage Debt to total assets
Table 2. Definition of variables
Table 2 shows the definition of dependent variable, elements of internal controls, our main
independent variables and control variables. In all cases, some proxy variables were used to
suit the nature of the study.
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5. Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics covers the dependent, independent and control variables used in the
study over the ten year period.
Variable mean max min sd skewness kurtosis p50
NPLTotLoane 3.793453 19.56 .27 4.073303 1.995312 7.492439 2.66
LoansDeposit 1.074995 1.497998 .6033253 .178887 .1513604 2.868119 1.077153
LoansTotAs .6926197 .8606263 .5223484 .0952179 .0155338 1.763342 .6896575
NonEarnings .0698189 .1550488 .0154269 .0337686 .2425023 2.408426 .0727355
TotalAssets 3.59e+08 1.68e+09 1483779 4.63e+08 1.611447 4.553111 1.42e+08
Boardindepe .4579452 .786 .19 .1511041 .4903246 2.634548 .45
BoardExpere .8990064 1 .5238095 .1171934 -1.534463 4.646694 .9333333
Managemente .9978256 1 .9444444 .0106035 -4.661183 22.84297 1
BoardSize 14.9589 21 8 3.878138 -.1801839 1.65548 15
AuditQuality 1 1 1 0 . . 1
Ageofbusins 80.45333 156 0 56.69389 .0671837 1.412734 80
NetInteresn 1.91596 2.95 .094 .5678443 -.1342021 3.022213 1.906
Newbranches 118.3733 2212 -612 380.7738 2.358308 14.12196 55
Corporaterg .36 1 0 .4832324 .5833333 1.340278 0
DebtTotalAs .9418331 .9656088 .91568 .0107296 .2103136 2.917855 .941469
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
A critical look at the mean (3.79%) and standard deviation (4.07%) for the dependent variable
NPL shows relatively lower mean for the sample compared to the national current average of
about 13%, there is so much variability as can be seen from the standard deviation. It can also
be seen that the dependent variable is positively skewed and peaked with reference to the
skewness and kurtosis. The means for the board characteristics like board independence and
board expertise in finance and management experience are very encouraging with the ratios
very close to one. The mean board size of almost 15 is an indication of relatively higher board
size. However, apart from management experience, the skewness and peakness of the board
and management characteristics are normal. The mean loans to total asset of almost 70%
indicate over-reliance of loans as the core of bank assets. The mean age and number of new
branches of banks sampled is 80 years and 118 respectively. Mean bank profitability intent of
approximately 2% and the minimum, maximum and median values are consistent with normal
practice and acceptable. A detailed display of the descriptive statistics which covers the mean,
maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis and median can be found in Table
3. The study reports  strong positive correlation between the number of years a bank has
existed and the control environment, risk management, control activities, profitability intent
and bank size. The association between the other variables can be found in the correlation
matrix which can be found in Appendix A. The explanations of the abbreviated forms of the
variables which is a key to the Pearson’s correlation matrix also found in Appendix B.
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6. Findings 
The  study  sought  to  examine  the  effectiveness  of  internal  control  systems,  explore  the
exposure of Spanish listed banks to default problems and establish the relationship between
internal  controls  and  credit  risk.  The  effectiveness  of  internal  controls  is  seen  from  the
descriptive  statistics.  The  mean  values  for  control  environment,  risk  assessment,  control
activities and monitoring are indications of attempt to make provision for effective internal
control systems. There is high board independence, large board size, experienced management
and high quality auditors. The study reveals that there is excessive desire to expand through
over branching. This has serious implications for cost of maintaining branches and controlling
activities. There is the tendency for head office to lose control in monitoring effectively what
goes on in all branches at all times. When there is proliferation of bank branches in specific
geographical areas, credit pollution through multiple borrowing is likely to occur since the same
clients will receive duplicated credit services from different branches (Steinwand, 2000). The
loan to deposit ratio of more than one (1) indicates that all deposits are absorbed by loans a
situation which could trigger liquidity problems should there be any delay in the servicing of
the  loan.  There  is  over-reliance  on  loans  as  the  major  asset  component.  This  does  not
commensurate with the long years of existence and experience and expertise of board and
management. Bank profitability intent is maintained within normal practice there is the need to
compliment it with good banking practices in order to keep credit risk in control. 
Variables like loans to deposit ratio debt to total asset ratio cast doubts on risk assessment
function of top management and board. The encouraging figures for the characteristics of the
board,  management  and  auditors  do  not  reflect  the  figures  for  monitoring,  control
environment, risk management, control  activities and information and communication. This
confirms  Agrawal  and  Mandelker  (1990)  who  emphasized  board  effectiveness  and  not
necessarily board characteristics. The conditions created exposes Spanish banks to so much
credit  risk conditions.  Risk taking decisions should  be done upon careful  risk assessment,
measurement, implementation and evaluation. There was no evidence of reporting material
internal control weakness and this seriously increases the risk exposure of banks.
The study finds very encouraging positive results for the independent variables. The results
show that internal controls explain credit risk very much. The R-squared value indicates that
72% of variations in credit risk is attributable to internal controls. This can be found in Table 4.
The result indicates that internal controls are capable of determining credit risk. The result
confirms the works of Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) who found some association between
internal controls and several risk measures like idiosyncratic risks and higher systematic risk.
We find an improvement in the works of (Kim, Song & Zhang, 2011) who reported no relation
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between internal control weakness and credit risk. It was reported by Chen et al. (2013) that
effective internal control system ensures good financial reporting and increases the confidence
of investors on the capital market. In the case of banks as found in this case, if  effective
internal control systems are enshrined, the already waning public confidence in the Spanish
banking industry as a result the collapse of several savings banks and over-indebtedness could
be repaired to some extent. The emphasis on effective internal controls was found by Ellul and
Yerramilli  (2013)  who reported  that  financial  institutions  with  strong  internal  risk  controls
survive financial  crisis.  This is  confirmed in our study looking at the explanatory power of
internal controls to credit risk. The result is again in tandem with the findings of Tang et al.
(2015) who found that internal control material weakness increases credit risk of firms. The
authors established some relationship between internal controls and credit risk as has been
found in our study. 
 Variables (1)Fixed effects
(2)
Random effects
(3)
Hausman test
LoansDeposit -4.247(4.166)
-8.888**
(3.739)
-8.888**
(3.739)
LoansTotAssets -14.116(12.055)
13.822*
(8.147)
13.822*
(8.147)
NonEarningAssetTotAssets 70.676***(26.055)
122.642***
(17.166)
122.642***
(17.166)
TotalAssets 0.000**(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
Boardindependence 5.109(5.092)
10.149**
(4.099)
10.149**
(4.099)
BoardExperticeinFinance 6.333(7.676)
13.016**
(6.251)
13.016**
(6.251)
ManagementExperience -11.938(35.714)
-27.099
(36.456)
-27.099
(36.456)
BoardSize 0.601*(0.337)
0.514***
(0.169)
0.514***
(0.169)
Ageofbank 0.076*(0.044)
-0.034**
(0.015)
-0.034**
(0.015)
NetInterestMargin -4.538***(1.222)
-4.304***
(1.102)
-4.304***
(1.102)
Newbranches -0.001(0.001)
-0.002*
(0.001)
-0.002*
(0.001)
Corporaterestructuring 0.235(0.870)
0.828
(0.896)
0.828
(0.896)
DebtTotalAssets -42.671(54.149)
-21.349
(49.283)
-21.349
(49.283)
Constant 47.236(62.060)
29.993
(58.239)
29.993
(58.239)
R-squared 0.724   
Sample size 73.00 73.00 73.00
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4. Random effects, fixed effects and Hausman’s test results
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Looking at the individual explanatory variables, seven of them significantly explain credit risk
at least at 95% confidence interval. Board size falls under the purview of control environment
in the internal control framework. It is found that board size significantly affect credit risk. This
finding agrees with Aliyu et al. (2014) who reported that board size influences good decisions
and control. An effective control environment created by the board as a result of their size
ensures segregation of  duties  and good human resource capacity.  The positive  correlation
between control environment and credit risk rather confirms that larger board sizes do not
necessarily ensure sound control environment (Uwuigbe & Fakile, 2012) contrary to the claim
by Chen & Al-Najjar (2012) that larger board sizes ensure effective monitoring. In the study of
Tunisian banks, Salhi and Boujelbene (2012) found same positive relation between board size
and bank risk taking.
It is found that loan-to-deposit ratio which is a proxy variable for compliance and prudence
found  under  the  control  activities  element  of  the  internal  control  framework  significantly
explained variations in bank credit risk. Control activities include ensuring approval limits are
observed, minimizing conflict of interest and ensuring segregation of duties (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, 2010). Although the result shows very significant relation between
control  activities  and  credit  risk,  the  correlation  coefficient  surprisingly  shows  a  negative
relationship.  This  is  contrary  to  our  expectation  and  might  be  an  indication  of  improper
enforcement  of  these  internal  control  mechanisms as  reported by  Agrawal  and Mandelker
(1990). They attribute such weaknesses to inactive board of directors.
Board expertise in finance and non-earning assets to total assets were used as proxy variables
for risk management component of the internal control framework. The results show significant
effect of risk management decisions on credit risk but report a positive relationship which is
contrary  to  our  expectation.  The  risk  management  function  of  board  and  management
members is a function of their expertise and experience. The expertise of top management and
board goes a long way to minimize internal control weakness (Ikpefan & Ojeka, 2013). The
study  confirms  the  assertion  by  Ikpefan  and  Ojeka  since  all  the  two  variables  for  risk
management  were  significant  on  the  dependent  variable.  The  result  converges  with  the
findings  of  Burak  Güner  et  al.  (2008)  that  board  members  with  finance  background
significantly  influence  investment  (including  credit)  and  financing  decisions.  It  is  however
interesting to find that a strong positive correlation existed between the risk management
function of board and management on one side and credit risk. It stand to suggest that, these
provisions are made but the implementers are not being effective as reported by Agrawal and
Mandelker (1990). The result seem to disagree with Minton et al. (2010) who did not find the
influence of board finance expertise in his study.
-379-
Intangible Capital – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/ic.703
Board  independence  which  falls  under  the  monitoring  component  of  the  internal  control
framework  significantly  affects  credit  risk.  The  ability  of  independent  board  members  to
significantly affect risk taking behaviour, corporate decisions and overall performance has been
confirmed (Eling & Marek, 2009; Pathan, 2009) and the result adds up to those schools of
thought. It was reported by Erkens, Hung and Matos (2012) that financial firms with large
board independence increased their risk taking behaviour. This is not different from the positive
relation our study has found between board independence and credit risk.
How long the bank has been in existence significantly affected credit risk and the correlation
was a negative one which means that the longer the years in business, the better the bank can
minimize credit risk and vice versa. This was an expected result and confirms the findings of
who found that the longer the years in business, the better the internal control system and
vice versa (Tang et al., 2015). The study found that the intention to be profitable (measured by
net interest margin) significantly affected credit risk (Shumway, 2001). This could lead to over-
ambitious  credit  facilities  which  might  eventually  go bad.  However,  our  expected negative
correlation between profit intention and credit risk was not sustained.
It was found that all the banks used the top four international auditing firms so audit quality
was dropped for  collinearity in the running of the results.  Again, financial  information was
reported on timely basis and as required so there was no need including that in output. The
result  confirms  earlier  studies  on  the  relationship  between  internal  controls  and  risk.
Ashbaugh-Skaife,  Collins,  Kinney  Jr  and  Lafond  (2009)  found  that  weak  internal  control
systems significantly resulted in higher idiosyncratic and systematic risks of firms.
7. Conclusion
The formalities of ensuring that internal control mechanisms are in place is unquestionable
about Spanish banks as it can be seen that at least four of the internal control elements were
significant predictors of credit risk. However, their effectiveness cannot be guaranteed because
their correlation coefficients do not depict that there are effective internal control systems.
Where  there are  effective  controls,  there  should  be inverse relationships  between internal
control variables and credit risk but the reverse was the case in our study. Large board size,
very independent board and high expertise and experience of board and management could
not ensure control of excessive branching thus resulting in increasing non-performing loans.
The  situation  does  not  guarantee  for  effective  internal  controls.  It  is  possible  that  since
independent board members have no investment to protect, they were caught by the usual
agency problem. 
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The seemingly ineffective internal control systems and the absence of strict enforcement of
disclosure of material internal control weakness exposes the listed Spanish banks to major
risks. This is because credit risk is a starting point for potential liquidity risk, insolvency and
possible failure as have been witnessed in Spain. It is not surprising to see quite some number
of banks no longer in  operation; a situation that  impairs  public  confidence in the banking
system. 
There is  significant effect of  internal controls on credit  risk. The control  environment, risk
management,  control  activities  and  monitoring  significantly  affect  credit  risk.  Board
independence, expertise, large size and management experience does not guarantee effective
internal controls. The agency problem still exists with independent board members who are not
motivated to protect shareholders’ investments. Internal control is not only under the purview
of operational risk but also credit risk. When internal governance is effective, credit risk could
be minimized. It is therefore not out of place to say that there is no bad borrower but a bad
lender. Given that internal control systems were effective, some of the catastrophes (collapse
of  banks)  could  have  been  avoided.  The  situation  whereby  Spanish  banks  do  not  report
material internal control weakness is not in the best interest of stakeholders and a full adoption
of the revised COSO internal control framework that emphasizes reporting material internal
controls will improve upon the situation. 
8. Limitations/implications
The absence  of  data  in  certain  years  did  not  make  the  data  a  balanced  panel  data  set.
Inactiveness of some banks in recent times did not allow the involvement of a larger number of
banks  thereby  limiting  the  sample  size.  In  any  case,  the  sample  size  satisfied  basic
assumptions  of  the  linear  regression  model.  Data  was  not  available  on  certain  planned
variables although there were proxy variables used. The use of quantitative variables for such
a study does not allow for much flexibility and in-depth scrutiny of internal control systems.
The study compliment research with primary sources of data therefore providing a systems
approach to investigating internal controls.  These limitations do not cast doubts about the
results  though.  The  study  has  implications  for  policy  makers,  the  Spanish  Central  Bank,
potential investors and the general public as a whole. There are various schools of thought on
the need to enact laws on internal controls (especially on reporting material internal control
weakness) as can be found in the US, Britain and China. The study provides insight for such
steps in to be initiated in Spain and other parts of Europe which might find this call worthy.
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9. Practical implications 
Banks have existing internal control systems and observe some of the principles. The study
found that financial reporting and involvement of high class auditors was the practice of all the
banks. Some banks are no longer in business leading to the involvement of only eight banks
which was not the situation in Spain some few years ago. Practically, the result provides much
confirmation as to how effective internal control systems could help minimize credit risk. This
brings on board a new dimension of  establishing the relationship between credit  risk and
operational  risk  because  most  risk management  research classifies  internal  controls  under
operational risk. Bank management should not only consider internal controls as an operational
risk issue but also credit risk. Again, it is not enough just to have the control mechanisms in
place but the full implementation thereof. Shareholders should be wary of independent board
members for their lack of motivation to protect the interest of shareholders (agency problem).
10. Social implications 
Banks  through  financial  intermediation  keep  the  economy running.  Banks  owe  it  a  social
responsibility to stay in business. The failure of banks affects depositors through the loss of
investments  which  brings  serious  externalities  on  other  banks.  When  one  bank  fails,  the
confidence of public  in banks is  seriously impaired.The study emphasizes the social  capital
banks gain through effective and reliable internal control systems especially when material
internal control weaknesses are reported. 
Acknowledgments
iWe  would  like  to  acknowledge  Frank  Gyimah  Sackey  (University  Rovira  and  Virgila)  and
Vincent  Kyere  Nartey  (University  of  Bonn)  for  their  support  and  assistance  towards  the
completion of the work.
References
AGRAWAL,  A.;  MANDELKER,  G.  N.  (1990).  Large  Shareholders  and  the  Monitoring  of
Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments.  The Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 25(2): 143-161. http://doi.org/10.2307/2330821
-382-
Intangible Capital – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/ic.703
ALAMÁ, L.; CONESA, D.; FORTE, A.; TORTOSA-AUSINA, E. (2015). The geography of Spanish
bank  branches.  Journal  of  Applied  Statistics,  42(4):  722-744.
http://doi.org/10.1080/02664763.2014.980792
ALIYU, N.S.; JAMIL, C.Z.M.; MOHAMED, R. (2014). The Mediating Role of Management Control
System in the Relationship between Corporate Governance and the Performance of Bailed-
out  Banks  in  Nigeria.  Procedia-Social  and  Behavioral  Sciences,  164:  613-620.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.11.154
AL TAMIMI, H.H.A.; AL MAZROOEI, M.F. (2007). Banks’ risk management: A comparison study‐ ‐
of  UAE  national  and  foreign  banks.  The  Journal  of  Risk  Finance,  8(4):  394-409.
http://doi.org/10.1108/15265940710777333
ALTAMURO,  J.;  BEATTY,  A.  (2010).  How  does  internal  control  regulation  affect  financial
reporting?.  Journal  of  Accounting  and  Economics,  49(1-2):  58-74.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.07.002
ALTMAN, E. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bank
ruptcy. Journal of Finance, 23: 589-609. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00843.x 
ALVES, C.; MENDES, V. (2004). Corporate Governance Policy and Company Performance: The
Portuguese  case. Corporate  Governance:  An  International  Review,  12:  290-301.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00370.x 
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (AICPA) (2006). Internal Control-
Integrated Framework: Executive Summary, Framework and Appendices, and Illustrative
Tools for Assessing Effectiveness of a System of Internal Control (3 volume set). AICPA.
ASHBAUGH-SKAIFE, H.; COLLINS, D.W.; KINNEY JR, W.R.; LAFOND, R. (2009). The Effect of
SOX Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of Equity.  Journal of Accounting
Research, 47(1): 1-43. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00315.x
ASHBAUGH-SKAIFE, H.; COLLINS, D.W.; KINNEY, W.R. (2007). The discovery and reporting of
internal  control  deficiencies  prior  to  SOX-mandated  audits.  Journal  of  Accounting  and
Economics, 44(1-2): 166-192. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.10.001
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION. (2010).  Principles for enhancing corporate
governance. Available online at: www.   bis.org
BEDARD,  J.  (2011).  Detection  and  severity  classification  of  Sarbanes-Oxley  section  404
internal  control  deficiencies.  Accounting  Review, 86  (3):  825-855.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.00000036 
BHAGAT,  S.;  JEFFERIS,  R.H.  (2002).  The  Econometrics  of  Corporate  Governance  Studies.
Cambridge, MA: MIT.
-383-
Intangible Capital – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/ic.703
BURAK GÜNER, A.; MALMENDIER, U.; TATE, G. (2008). Financial expertise of directors. Journal
of Financial Economics, 88(2): 323-354. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.05.009
CARBALLO-CRUZ, F. (2011). Causes and consequences of the Spanish economic crisis: Why
the  recovery  has  taken  so  long?.  Panoeconomicus,  3:  309-328.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/PAN1103309C 
CASU, B.; GIRADONE, C.; MOLYNEUX, P. (2006). Introduction to Banking (pp. 50-75). Pearson
FT.
CEBENOYAN, A.S.; STRAHAN, P.E. (2004). Risk management, capital structure and lending at
banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, 28(1): 19-43. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00391-
6
CHEN,  C.H.;  AL-NAJJAR,  B.  (2012).  The  determinants  of  board  size  and  independence:
Evidence  from  China.  International  Business  Review,  21(5):  831-846.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2011.09.008
CHEN, H.; DONG, W.; HAN, H.; ZHOU, N. (2013). A comprehensive and quantitative internal
control  index:  Construction,  validation  and  impact (p.  64).  Presented  at  the  American
Accounting Association Annual Meeting. Available online at: http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2368000
CHISLETT, W. (2014). Spain’s banking crisis: A light in the tunnel. Elcano Royal Institute, ARI,
ARI 11/2014: 1–8.
COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission) (1992). Internal
Control-Integrated Framework. New York: AICPA.
DELIS, M.D.; KARAVIAS, Y. (2015). Optimal versus realized bank credit  risk and monetary
policy. Journal of Financial Stability, 16: 13-30. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2014.11.004
DOYLE, J.T.; GE, W.; MCVAY, S. (2007). Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial
Reporting. The Accounting Review, 82(5): 1141-1170. http://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2007.82.5.1141
ELDENBURG,  L.;  HERMALIN,  B.E.;  WEISBACH,  M.S.;  WOSINSKA,  M.  (2004).  Governance,
performance  objectives  and  organizational  form:  Evidence  from  hospitals.  Journal  of
Corporate Finance, 10(4): 527-548. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(03)00031-2
ELING, M.; MAREK, S. (2009). Corporate Governance and Risk Taking: Evidence from the U.K.
and German Insurance Markets. University of ULM.
ELLUL, A.; YERRAMILLI, V. (2013). Stronger risk controls, lower risk: Evidence from U.S. bank
holding companies. Journal of Finance, 68(5): 1757-1803. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12057 
ERKENS, D.H.; HUNG, M.; MATOS, P. (2012). Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial
crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide.  Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(2):
389-411. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.01.005
-384-
Intangible Capital – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/ic.703
FERNÁNDEZ-RODRÍGUEZ,  E.;  GÓMEZ-ANSÓN,  S.;  CUERVO-GARCÍA,  A.  (2004).  The  Stock
Market Reaction to the Introduction of Best Practices Codes by Spanish Firms.  Corporate
Governance:  An  International  Review,  12:  29-46.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8683.2004.00341.x 
FOMBRUN, C.; SHANLEY, M. (1990). What’s in a Name? Reputation Building and Corporate
Strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 33: 233-258. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/256324 
FUKUDA, S.; KASUYA, M.; AKASHI, K. (2009). Impaired bank health and default risk. Pacific-
Basin Finance Journal, 17(2): 145-162. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2008.06.002
GAO (1991).  Failed banks: Accounting and Auditing Reforms Urgently Needed. Report to the
Congressional Committees
GAO (1994).  Depository institutions: Divergent loan loss methods undermine usefulness of
financial  reports.  United  States  General  Accounting  Office–Report  to  Congressional
Committees.
GONCHAROV, I.; WERNER, J.R.; ZIMMERMANN, J. (2006). Does compliance with the German
corporate  governance  code  have  an  impact  on stock  valuation?:  An  empirical  analysis.
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(5): 432-445. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8683.2006.00516.x
HAQ, M.; FAFF, R.; SETH, R.; MOHANTY, S. (2014). Disciplinary tools and bank risk exposure.
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 26: 37-64. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2013.10.005
HART, O. (1995). Corporate governance: Some theory and implications. The Economic Journal,
105(430): 678-689. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2235027 
HILLEGEIST,  S.A.;  KEATING,  E.K.;  CRAM,  D.P.;  LUNDSTEDT,  K.G.  (2004).  Assessing  the
probability  of  bankruptcy.  Review  of  Accounting  Studies,  9:  5-34.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:RAST.0000013627.90884.b7 
HU, J.-L.; LI,  Y.; CHIU, Y.H. (2006). Ownership and Non-Performing Loans: Evidence from
Taiwan’s  Banks.  The Developing Economies,  42(3): 405-420.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-
1049.2004.tb00945.x 
IKPEFAN, O.; OJEKA, S. (2013). Corporate Governance as a tool for curbing banks distress in
Nigeria  Deposit  Money  Banks:  Empirical  Evidence.  Research  Journal  of  Finance  and
Accounting, 4(13): 41-51.
IMF (INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND) (2012).  Spain:  Safety  Net,  Bank  Resolution,  and
Crisis Management Framework— Technical Note. IMF Country Report No. 12/145: 1-39
JIMÉNEZ, G.; LOPEZ, J.A.; SAURINA, J. (2013). How does competition affect bank risk-taking?
Journal of Financial Stability, 9(2): 185-195. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2013.02.004
-385-
Intangible Capital – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/ic.703
JIN, J.Y.; KANAGARETNAM, K.; LOBO, G.J.; MATHIEU, R. (2013). Impact of FDICIA internal
controls  on  bank  risk  taking.  Journal  of  Banking  and  Finance,  37(2):  614-624.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.09.013
JI,  X.;  LU,  W.;  QU,  W.  (2015).  Determinants  and  economic  consequences  of  voluntary
disclosure of internal control weaknesses in China. Journal of Contemporary Accounting and
Economics, 11(1): 1-17. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2014.12.001
JOKIPII,  A.  (2006,  September).  The  Structure  and  Effectiveness  of  Internal  Controls-  A
Contingency Approach (Acta Wasaensia No. 166). University of Vaasa, Finland.
KIM,  J.-B.;  SONG,  B.Y.;  ZHANG,  L.  (2011).  Internal  control  weakness  and  bank  loan
contracting: Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures.  The Accounting Review, 86(4):
1157-1188. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-10036 
LAEVEN,  L.;  LEVINE,  R.  (2009).  Bank  governance,  regulation  and  risk  taking.  Journal  of
Financial Economics, 93(2): 259–275. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.09.003
LAKIS, V.; GIRIUNAS, L. (2012). The concept of internal control system: Theoretical aspect.
Ekonomika 2012, 91(2): 142-152.
LETZA,  S.;  KIRKBRIDE,  J.;  SUN,  X;  SMALL,  C.  (2008).  Corporate  governance  theorizing:
Limits,  critics,  and  alternatives.  International  Journal  of  law  and  management,  50(1):
17-32.
LOZANO-VIVAS,  A.  (1998).  Efficiency  and  technical  change  for  Spanish  banks.  Applied
Financial Economics, 8(3): 289-300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/096031098333041 
MAIJOOR,  S.  (2000).  The  internal  control  explosion.  International  Journal  of  Auditing,  4:
101-109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1099-1123.00305 
MCNALLY, S.J. (2013, June).  COSO McNallyTransition Article-Final COSO VersionProof_5-31-
13.pdf.  Available  online  at:  http://www.coso.org/documents/COSO%20McNallyTransition%20Article-Final
%20COSO%20Version%20Proof_5-31-13.pdf (Las access date: April 9th, 2015).
MINTON,  B.;  TAILLARD,  J.P.A.;  WILLIAMSON,  R.  (2010).  Do  independence  and  financial
expertise of the board matter for risk taking and performance?.  Charles A. Dice Center
Working Paper No. 2010-14.
MISHKIN, F. (2006). The Economics of Money, Banking and Financial Markets (8th ed. pp. 219-
279). Boston, USA, Pearson Education Inc.
MORTH,  U.  (2004).  Soft  law  in  governance  and  regulation:  An  interdisciplinary  analysis.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
OLATUNJI,  O.C.  (2009).  Impact  of  internal  control  system  on  banking  sector  in  Nigeria.
Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences, 6(4): 181-189.
-386-
Intangible Capital – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/ic.703
PATHAN, S. (2009). Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking. Journal of Banking and
Finance, 33(7): 1340-1350. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.02.001
RITTENBERG, L.; SCHWIEGER, B. (2001). Auditing Concepts for a Changing Environment. FL:
Harcourt College Publishers.
SAHLIN-ANDERSSON, K. (2004). Emergent cross-sectional soft regulations: Dynamics at play
in the global compact initiative. In: U. Morth (Ed.), Soft law in governance and regulation:
An interdisciplinary analysis (pp. 129–152). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
SALHI, B.; BOUJELBENE, Y. (2012). Effect of internal banking mechanisms of governance on
the  risk  taking by  the Tunisian  banks.  International  Journal  of  Economics,  Finance and
Management, 1(1): 8-19.
SAURINA,  J.;  JIMENEZ,  G.  (2006,  March).  Credit  Cycles,  Credit  Risk,  and  Prudential
Regulation.  Available  online  at:  http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/718/1/MPRA_paper_718.pdf.  (Las
access date: April 9th, 2015).
SHUMWAY, T. (2001). Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard Model.  The
Journal of Business, 74(1): 101-124. http://doi.org/10.1086/209665
SOBEHART, J.; KEENAN, S.; STEIN, R. (2001). Benchmarking quantitative default risk models:
A validation methodology. Algo Research Quarterly (Algorithmics), 4 (1/2): 57-72.
STEINWAND,  D.  (2000).  A  risk  management  framework  for  microfinance  institutions.
MicroFinance Network prepared for Deutsche Gesellschaft für Tech nische Zusammenarbeit,
Chicaco. Available online at: http://www.gtz.de/en/
TANG, D.; TIAN, F.; YAN, H. (2015). Internal Control Quality and Credit Default Swap Spreads.
(In-Press). http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/acch-51100 
TORRES-REYNA,  O.  (2007).  Panel  Data  Analysis-  Fixed  and  Random  Effect  using  Stata.
Available online at: http://dss.princeton.educ/training Retrieved on 20-03-2015
UWUIGBE, O.R.; FAKILE, A.S. (2012). The Effects of Board Size on Financial Performance of
Banks: A Study of Listed Banks in Nigeria. International Journal of Economics and Finance,
4(2): 260-267. http://doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v4n2p260
ZHANG, Y.; ZHOU, J.; ZHOU, N. (2007). Audit committee quality, auditor independence, and
internal  control  weaknesses.  Journal  of  Accounting  and  Public  Policy,  26(3):  300-327.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2007.03.001
-387-
Intangible Capital – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/ic.703
Appendix A
Pearson’s correlation coefficients (Pair wise 2 sided)
 AB BEF BI BS CR DTA LD
AB 1       
BEF 0.46* 1      
BI 0.631* 0.1361 1     
BS 0.0387 -0.603* -0.064 1    
CR 0.3352* 0.1991 0.2076 0.1231 1   
DTA -0.03 0.1812 0.1196 -0.296* 0.0046 1  
LD -0.248* 0.3381* -0.369* -0.326* 0.1016 -0.134 1
LNTA 0.638* 0.3654* 0.2262 0.0971 0.3204* -0.261* -0.135
LTA -0.495* -0.065 -0.294* -0.093 -0.188 0.062 0.582*
ME 0.0356 -0.086 0.1098 -0.167 0.0288 0.1488 -0.259*
NB 0.2093 0.1064 -0.051 0.1492 0.2412* 0.1482 0.007
NEATA 0.6599* 0.2719* 0.2397* 0.0917 0.209 -0.368* -0.203
NIM 0.5508* 0.1764 0.4022* 0.2969* 0.0605 -0.408* -0.163
NPLTL 0.0648 -0.023 0.0757 0.0931 0.1497 -0.104 -0.181
TA 0.6521* 0.0488 0.2635* 0.341* 0.0771 -0.194 -0.412*
 NOTE: * indicates p<0.05
 LNTA LTA ME NB NEATA NIM NPLTL TA
AB         
BEF         
BI         
BS         
CR         
DTA         
LD         
LNTA 1        
LTA -0.771* 1       
ME 0.017 -0.282* 1      
NB 0.178 -0.156 0.039 1     
NEATA 0.6975* -0.62* 0.1812 0.1854 1    
NIM 0.3288* -0.11 -0.255* -0.025 0.3647* 1   
NPLTL 0.1254 -0.201 0.1516 -0.036 0.4724* -0.161 1  
TA 0.7774* -0.725* 0.1151 0.2596* 0.6569* 0.4667* 0.0101 1
NOTE: * indicates p<0.05 
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Appendix B
Key for abbreviated variables
NPL_Tot Loans NPLTL
Loans_Deposit LD
Loans_Tot Assets LTA
NonEarningAsset_Tot Assets NEATA
Total_Assets TA
Natural Logarithm of Total Assets LNTA
Boardindependence BI
BoardExperticeinFince BE
Magement_Experctice ME
Board Size BS
Ageofbusiness AB
NetInterestMargin NIM
Newbranches NB
Corporate_restructuring CR
Debt_Total Assets DTA
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